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NOTE AND COMMENT
A CALL TO LAWYERS.-The following letter, which explains itself, has been
received from the secretary of the special committee for war service of the
American Bar Association.
"ED1ToR, MICHIGAN LAW REvmw,
Law School, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.
DEAR Sm:
The American Bar Association has appointed a Special Committee for
War Service, whose function is to supply the right lawyers to any Department
of the Government in need of men with legal training. This activity has the
sanction and cordial approval of President Wilson and his Cabinet, who have
suggested that it be carried on in cooperation with the U. S. Public Service
Reserve of the Department of Labor.
The Special Committee consisting of John Lowell, Chairman, and Lawrence G. Brooks, Secretary, is now established in Washington at 17I2 Eye
Street, where it is engaged in making a survey of the several Government
Departments and Bureaus to ascertain the kind of work at present being done
by lawyers, the number of additional lawyers now needed, and the extent of
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the probabie future demand for members of the legal profession. The Committee, on the other hand, is canvassing the situation through the many
channels open to the American Bar Association, to discover what lawyers
of ability are available for the Government.
The survey so far made shows that lawyers are wanted by 1:he Government in a variety of capacities, both legal and executive, volunteer and compensated, to work ·in Washington and elsewhere,-that the Association, in
short, has a splendid opportunity for National Service. The Special Committee is now preparing as rapidly as possible to perform this .service, and
expects soon to be in a position promptly and capably to answer the call of
any Department for men with legal experience.
The Committee asks that all lawyers willing and able to serve the Government at this time send their names to the American Bar Association at
1712 Eye Street, Washington, D. C., with a brief statement of their training
and qualifications and the conditions under which they are able to serv~.
Very truly yours,
LAwru::Na: G. BROOKS,
Secretary Special Committee for War Service."
EI'~CT oF CHANG~ OF LAW Ul'ON OBLIGATION TO PAY fuNT.-In McCullough Realty Co. v. Laemmle Film Service, (Nov. 16, 1917), 165 N. W. 33,
the supreme court of Iowa had occasion to pass upon a question which has
become increasingly frequent with the spread of prohibition laws, namely,
the effect upon the obligation of a tenant to pay rent, of a subsequent law
that makes it unlawful for him to use the premises for the purpose for which
he leased them. The case before the Iowa court was not one arising out of
a lease of premises for saloon purposes, but the question involved was precisely the same, and the saloon cases were relied upon for the decision. The
action was for rent upon a written lease containing the following clause:
"Said premises are leased for Film Exchange and film and theatre supplies
purposes only and are not to be used for any unlawful or offensive purposes
whatever." The defendant contended that by reason of a city ordinance,
passed after the demise, providing that it should be unlawful to store, handle,
etc. any inflammable motion picture films in buildings which are not fireproof, it had become impossible to use the premises for- the purposes for
which they were leased. The lessee had vacated the premises. It appeared
that the handling of films was 99 per-cent of the business of a film exchange,
and that it was wholly impracticable to keep the films at one place and have
the office at another. Being of opinion that "the entire beneficial use of the
leased premises was prevented by the ordinance", the court held the defendant freed of the obligation to pay rent.
Where a lease contains a clause permitting the premises to be used for
saloon purposes and the premises are in fact so used, a subsequent change
in the law making it unlawful to operate a saloon does not affect the tenant's
rent liability. Haston v. Seattle Bre·wing and Malting Co., (19n), 66 Wash.
248. 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 432; H)•att v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co., (1912),
168 Mich. 36o. But where the lease restricted the use of the premises to such
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purpose, such subsequent change in the law was held to release the tenant.
The Stratford Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & llfaltiug Co., (1916), 94 Wash. 125,
L. R. A. 1917 C 931. So also in Heart v. East Te11nessee Brewi11g Co., (1908),
121 Tenn. 69, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 964; Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabso11, (1912),
179 Ala. 444, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 664; Kahn v. Wilhelm, (1915), u8 Ark.
239. On the other hand, it has been held that even when the use of the leased
premises is restricted to the business later made unlawful, there is no release from rent liability. Lawrence v. White, (1909), 131 Ga. -840, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 966 dictum; Goodrum Tobacco Co. v. Potts-Thompsoii Liquor Co.,
(1910), 133 Ga. 776, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 4g8; Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., (19u),
19 Wyo. 18, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 773 semble.
If the subsequent change in law does not prevent entirely the beneficial
use of the demised premises, the tenant may be held liable despite the fact
that he is prevented from carrying on the principal business for which the
premises were taken. Standard Brewing Co. v. Weil, (1916), 129 Md. 487.
So where a "saloon" is considered as not necessarily a place where intoxicating liquors are sold, the tenant must pay, for he may dispense soft drinks,
etc. O'B31me v. He11ley, (1909), 161 Ala. 620, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 4g6; Hecht
v. Acme Coal Co., supra; In re Bradle3•, (1915), 225 Fed. 307.
That a "saloon" is not necessarily a place where intoxicants are sold, see
also Kitso11 v. A1111 Arbor, 26 Mich. 325. Such liberal meaning of the word,
however, has been denied. The Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., supra. But where the lease restricts the use of the premises to purposes of a "bar" or "bar-room", it is considered that intoxicating liquors are
to be sold. Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, supra, and in The Stratford, Inc. v.
Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., supra, the tenant was deemed discharged
despite the fact that by a modification of the lease permission had been given
to operate on the premises a bootblacking stand and a restaurant and to sell .
tobacco, the court going on the ground that the running of a saloon was the
real purpose for which the premises had been leased; it was that which fixed
the rental. The principal case thus accords with the case just cited. See also
Kahn v. Willielm, supra.
The decisions that the lessee is relieved from his obligation to pay rent
are not agreed as to the reason for such result. In the Heart case the court
went on the ground that the purpose for which the lease was made having
become unlawful the whole lease ''became and is void and unenforceable at
the instance of either party." In the Greil Bros. Co. case the court speaks
of subsequent impossibility of performance by reason of change in law and
~lso of destruction of a thing the continued existence of which is assumed
as a basis of the agreement. Kahn v. Wilhelm went on the ground that the
performance having become unlawful the contract was void. And in The
Stratford case the court treated the problem as covered by the general rule
that performance of a contract is excused when by subsequent change in
law the acts called for are rendered unlawful.
Where premises are leased and it is stipulated that they shall be used
only for a certain purpose and by a change in law such use is made unlawful,
it is of course perfectly clear that the tenant could not be required to abide
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by the restrictive term of the lease. Baily v. De Crespigns, L. R. 4 Q. B. I8o.
But does it necessarily follow that the whole lease is at an end or void, as
said by some courts? Should such illegality of performance any more than
drop such restrictive provision out of the lease? The lessee would· then be
left free to use the premises for any lawful purpose. If the whole lease is to
be treated as at an end, must it not be on the theory that a condition to that
effect is to be implied? As to whether there is sufficient reason for reading
such a condition into such leases there may well be differences of opinion. '
It is not surprising then, as pointed out above, that the cases are. not agreed;
but it is believed that the cases holding the lessee completely discharged at
least have gone on unsound grounds.
In support of the view that the lessee should be relieved Hooper v. Mueller, ( 1909), IS8 Mich. 595, is apt to be cited. There it was held that the provisions of the "local-option law" having become operative in the county in
which were saloon premises held by defendant as lessee, he was released from
the obligation of paying rent. It must be observed that the lessors had· there
agreed "that in case they are unable to furnish, that is, secure, for the said
second parties, or the tenant of said parties, two sufficient bondsmen required
by law in case of retail dealers in malt and spirituous liquors, at second'
parties's own proper expense, however, then this lease shall be and become
void". The vote in favor of local option having made it impossible for the
· 1essors to furnish such bondsmen, the lease by its very terms was void, and
the court so held. The case, then, does not furnish any ruling whatever on
the main question under discussion. The Arkansas court, however, in Kahn
v. Wilhelm, supra, failed completely to appreciate what the court had to
decide in Hooper v. Mueller.
R. W. A.
MITIGA'tION oF DAMAG:ES IN BR:EACH oF CoN'tRACT-Dutv ro AcCIU"t OFttR
OF D:EFAUI.'tING CoNTRACToR.-'fhere has been a decided reluctance on the
part of some courts to apply the doctrine of mitigation of damages to the
extent of requiring the injured party to accept delayed or altered performance offered by the defaulting contractor after breach. Thus, in the recent
case, Coppola v. •'ftfarden, Orth & Hastings Co., (111. I9I7), n8 N. E ..499,
where the sale was on 6o-day credit. and the vendor's offer after breach to
sell for cash was refused, the court declined to rule that the vendee's recovery would be merely the amount of interest for the period of credit on the
sums involved. Other courts, however, have put the defaulter on the same
plane as any other offeror on the market. An early case suggested that a ·
discharged employee would be obliged to re-enter his master's service in
order to reduce the damage. Saunders v. Anderson, 2 Hill Law, (S. C.), 485.
This dictum was followed in Birdsong v. Ellis, 62 Miss. 4I8. And the same
conclusion was reached in: Squire v. Wright, I Mo. App. I72; Hamill v.
Foute.. SI Mq. 4I9; Bigelow v. Amer. Forcite Powder Mfg. Co., 39 Hun 599.
That a lessee must accept the premises offered after breach of contract of
lease was held in: Hodges v. Fries & Co., 34 Fla. 63; Himtington Co. v.
Parsons, 62 W. Va. 26. The idea was given a decided impetus by the decision of Lurton, J. (under facts analogous to those of the instant case) in
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Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62, 26 L. R. A. 167, which derived its authority
from Deere v. Lewis, 51 Ill. 254 and the dictum in Warren. v. Stoddart, 105
U. S. 224- But subsequent decisions have created much confusion in trying
to straight-jacket the rights of the parties to fit the words 'waiver' and 'substitution' and fixed rules of law instead of considering the fundamental rights
in the matter of reaspnable mitigation.
Campfield v. Sauer, 189 Fed. 57<>, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837 held that an
offer conditional on waiver of the right to damages for the breach did not
have to be accepted.' See also Coulter v. Thompso1i Lumber Co., 142 Fed.
7o6 and Hirsch v. Ga. etc."Co., 16Q Fed. 578; Wliitmarsh v. Littlefield, 46
Hun 418. But what is this waiver in contracts? Acceptance of performance after breach creates a waiver which is in reality a new contract. EwAR't
on WAIVER DIS'tRIBU'tliD, 124 et seq. The waiver, however, is only of the
right to treat the contract as discharged ; the right of action for damages
subsists. Garfield Co. v. Ry., 166 Mass. n9; Bow:ims on LAW o:g WAIVER, 35.
Therefore, even though the defaulter's offer is point blank without any mention of mitigation, an acceptance would not waive the right to recover for
the breach. The main objection raised by the court in the instant case is
thus obviated. However, an offer may be couched in such terms as to make
it conditional on express waiYer of the right of action by the offeree; and
Cooley, J. in Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266 held that
resumed performance by the offeror is adequate consideration for such
waiver. This seems to be nothing other than an accord and satisfaction.
Acceptance of such an offer, then, is truly dangerous. Creve Coe11r Lake
Ice Co. v. Tamm, 90 Mo. App. 189. But there is no good reason why it
should be declared unreasonable as a matter of law. Waiver is no exception
to the principle that the contract should be sent to the jury "for their consfileration in determining respondent's duty as to his acceptance of such
offered contract under all the circumstances". Waldrip v. Hill, 70 Wash. 187.
The state courts have also labored under the impression that to require
the acceptance of the delinquent's offer would force a substitution of a contract made by the courts for one made by the parties. Krebs Hop Co. v.
Livesley tendered the reason that "where a new contract is made by the parties in regard to the same subject-matter, which entirely supersedes the first
contract, no action can be maintained on a ground of a breach of the first
contract." 59 Ore. 586 at 589. The fallacy here is that there is no such
thing as substitution after breach-indeed, the case cited as authority in the
Krebs opinion involved substitution before breach. After a right of action
accrues it can be replaced only by a release' or an accord and satisfaction;
any other subsequent agreement will not prejudice the remedy. McKnight
v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537. The substifution theory must lead to the absurd
conclusion that every subsequent agreement is presumptively an accord
and satisfaction. There is another way of answering the objection. No one
would contend that a contract with a third person made in pursuance of an
attempt to mitigate would substitute the original agreement. Nor would
another contract with the defaulter, but wholly disconnected with the old,
substitute that contract. Nebmska Bridge, etc. Co. v. Owen Conway & Sons,
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12'/ Iowa 237. The contract with the delinquent might, therefore, be considered as a disconnected contract-an agreement entered into in an attempt to
mitigate damages by purchase from the offeror as one on the market.
Several objections of policy have also been raised. In Creve Coeur Lake
Ice Co. v. Tamm, supra, it was recognized that the injured party had a just
resentment which .f.ie could nurture against one who broke a contract, consequently he could refuse the offer. To lend sanction to such an argument
would be to uproot the entire doctrine of mitigation of damages that if the
party entitled to the benefit of the contract can protect himself from a loss,
arising from a breach, at a trifling expense o~ with reasonable exertions he
must do so. Miller v. Mariner's Church, 7 Me. 51. The conclusiOn would
inevitably be that the injured party would not even have to purChase from
a third person. A late case, reiterating Lawrence v. Porter, very ably an-.
swered this contention. The court declared that the injured party should not
be permitted to adopt a course "possibly dictated by a desire to injure another rather than save himself. A breach of contract entitles the injured
party to be compensated for such loss thereby entailed upon him as he cannot avoid by the exercise of reasonable care, but is not to be made use of
by him as an opportunity to gratify a feeling of resentment by inflicting unnecessary hardship upon the party in default. The law sustains his claim to
compensatory damages, but does not give him the election to make them
punitive". Borden & Co. v. Vinegar Bend Lumber Co., 7 Ala. App. 335.
To the same effect see: Borden & Co. v. Vinegar Bend Lumber Co., 2 Ala.
App. 354; Birdsong v. Ellis, supra; Hur~thal v. Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87,
102; Manhattan City Interurban Ry. Co. v. General Electric Co., 226 Fed.
173· To be sure a party might reasonably be expected to refuse another
offer from a contractor who has been guilty of reprehensible conduct in
creating undesirable circumstances. Levin v. Standard Fashion Co., 16 Daly
(N. Y) 404- But this is a question for the jury on the matter of the reasonableness of the required mitigation. The court should not be over-zealous
in its paternal protection to the innocent contractor.
But it is further asked: "What security is there that the second agreement will not be treated as lightly as the first?" The answer here is that
the argument would militate with equal. force against permitting any accord
and satisfaction or disconnected contract; the fact that these are allowed
indicates that the argument has no weight. For, might not an accord and
satisfaction be broken as easily as the contract for which it is a satisfaction?
Coxe Eros. & Co. v. Anoka, etc. Co., 87 Minn. 56, and Campfield v. Sa11er
put a further limitation on the doctrine of Lawrence v. Porter. The court
in the Coxe case said that the latter case could not apply ''because there was
not testimony tending to show that the same quality of coal was 'not purchaseable from other parties',-a qualification mentioned in the Lawrence
case''. The writer after carefully examining Lawrence v. Porter has been
able to find no such qualification. The conclusion in the Coxe case was
reached no doubt by a reading of the syllabus in L. R. A. from which the
quotation is copied verbatim. The language of Lurton, ]. in Lawrence v.
Porter cannot be taken to be more than a refutation of the resentment argu-
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ment for he says, in discussing the theory of Warren v. Stoddart, that the
buyer would have to accept if the duty to mitigate by replacement required
him to buy from the delinquent seller "if the article can be obtained only
from him, or because he offers it cheaper than it can be obtained from
others". It seems then that a mere unimportant circumstance has been made
a condition by the later decisions.
The solution seems to lie in the abandonment of the forced distinctions
between waiver, substitution, and mitigation. The sole question should be:
Is it reasonable under all the circumstances· that the new offer should be ac·
cepted? So far the courts have borne a prejudice against a defaulting con·
tractor which the law should not recognize, if it is to be consistent with the
generally accepted principle of Miller v. Mariner's Church. If the courts
would bear in mind that "the innocent party is simply entitled to his !eal
loss" and that it is not criminal to break a contract, they would fall in line
with Lawrence v. Porter with much greater alacrity.
Other cases in accord with the principle but not mentioned above are:
Ashley v. Rocky Mountain Bell T. Co., :25 Mont. :286 (but see Brazell v.
Cohn, 32 Mont. 556); Lande v. Hyde, 66 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) ::z59; Heilbroner
v. Hancock, 33 Tex. 7IS. There are some pertinent dicta in: Howard v.
Vaughan-Monnig Shoe Co., 8:2 Mo. App. 405, 4Io; Levin v. The Standard
Fashio1i Co., supra, at 409; Chisholm v. Assurance Co., II2 Mich. 50, 56;
Jackson v. bidependent School District, uo Iowa, 3I3 (but see The Louis
Cook Mfg. Co. v. Randall, 62 Iowa, 244).
There is a comprehensive note taking an opposite view from this one in
IO MICH. LAW :Riw. 3I5.
A. J. L.
"ANGr.<>-SAXoN" AND "TuUTONic" STANDARDS oF Jus'tlct.-In The Kaiser
Wilhelm II, :230 Fed. Rep. 7I7, the British shipbuilding firm of Harland &
Wolff filed a libel against the steamship Kaiser Wilhelm II, owned by the
North German Lloyd, a German corporation, for repairs made on the ship
in libelant's shipyard in England. This suit was commenced before the United States entered the war, and the court made an order dismissing the libel
on the ground that Great Britain and Ge~many had each enacted laws forbidding its subjects from making any payments to the subjects of the other,
and as these enactments were merely declaratory of the common law of
nations, neutrality would be best preserved by applying them to litigation in
a neutral court This order was reversed on appeal, for the reason that the
vessel had been enabled to seek protection in an American port through the
very repairs the libelant had made, and the lien which the libelant had upon
the vessel would be lost if the cause were dismissed. 246 Fed. ReJ!. 786.
But while this appeal was pending the United States entered the war as
an ally of Great Britain against Germany, and the vessel was taken over
by the United States government. These facts, under the admiralty practice,
came properly before the court on the appeal, and it was held that justice
to both litigants could best be secured by retaining jurisdiction until after the
war, so that the German owner might have an opportunity to litigate its
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rights in case relations with this country were hereafter resumed, and the
rights of the United States government might be determined in relation
to the rights of the British lienor. In explaining this decision the court,
'made up of BUFFINGTON, McPmmsoN and Woou.F;Y, circuit judges, proceeded to say:"In following ~his course, and protecting the unprotected rights of an
absent German citizen while this country is at war with the Imperial Government of its country, we are impelled by three all-sufficient reasons : First,
the innate sense of fairness, decency, and justice, which respects the rights
of an enemy; second, the broad principles of international intercourse, which
leads courts and nations that believe in international rights, to be the more
careful to observe them toward belligerents; and lastly, 'because the awarding
to this German citizen, with whom our country is at war, the careful preservation until times of peace of its rights is in line with those high ideals of
Anglo-Saxon justice which led the British courts years ago, in Ex-Parle
Boussmaker, 13 Vesey, 71, decided in l8o6, to allow the claim of an alien
enemy to be proved in time of war and the dividends held by the British
court until peace. Indeed, the fact that our country is now at war with
Germany is all the more reason why this court should most scrupulously
award to this German citizen those international and equitable rights which
no fair-minded people ever deny even to their enemies in times of war."
In contrast with Germany's cynical, brutal and systematic policy of denying all rights to its enemies in time of war, this striking illustration of the
moral quality underlying the Anglo-Saxon common law brings out into
strong relief the reason for the world war and the immense issue at stake.
E.R. S.
TB~ F£Dl'ltAL BANKRUP'l'CY Ar:r AND rrs Emr:r oN STA~ INso:r.vtNcY
LAws.-Since Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, it has been clear that
State Insolvency Laws were valid (within certain well-defined limits) during
the non-existence of a Federal Bankruptcy Act, and ·that upon the enactment
of a Federal Bankruptcy Act the State laws were superseded and suspended
so far as they were in conflict with the Federal legislation. The difficulty
has been in determining when there was such conflict, and it ha~ arisen in
various ways. For instance, the Federal Bankruptcy Act permits any natural person to become voluntary bankrupt, but provides that no involuntary
proceedings shall be taken against a farmer or a wage earner, or a person
owing less than $1,000. The question has frequently been raised whether
State Insolvency Laws are still effective in the cases of persons thus exempted by the Federal Act, and has been variously decided. See Littlefield v.
Gay, g6 Me. 422; Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. I (commented on in II MICH. L.
REY. 6o); Rockville Bank v. Latham, 88 Conn. 70; and Pitcher v. Standish,
go Conn. 6o1 .. (commented on in 15 MICH. L. REY. 68). The Supreme Court
of the United States, in the recent case of Stellwagm v. Clum, 38 Sup. Ct.
215, has now passed on another phase of the same question.
An Ohio statute (i§§ 6343-4, Rev. Stat. Ohio; §§ u102-5, General Code
of Ohio) provides that if an insolvent debtor makes a conveyance or

a

NOTE AND COMMENT
suffers a judgment with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or with
intent to prefer one or more creditors, such conveyance or judgment shall
be void at the suit of any creditor; and in such creditor's suit "a receiver
may be appointed who shall take charge of all the assets of such debtor * * *
including the property so sold, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, which
receiver shall administer all the assets of the debtor * * * for the equal
benefit of all the creditors of the debtor * * * in proportion to the amount
of their respective demands * * *·" An insolvent corporation in Ohio made
conveyances of lumber, which fell within the ~erms of the above statute;
more than four months later it made a general assignment for the benefit
of its creditors and a few days later was adjudicated bankrupt. Its trustee
in bankruptcy was in possession of the lumber thus conveyed, and the vendee
in the conveyances filed a petition asking that the lumber be turned over to
him. The trustee in bankruptcy insisted that the conveyances made to the
petitioner were fraudulent and voidable. But as the conveyances were made
and completed more than four months before bankruptcy he could not rely
upon § 6ob, which gives the trustee power to avoid and recover preferences,
nor upon § 67e, which gives him power to avoid fraudulent transfers; both
of these sections require that the transaction avoided must have taken place
within four months before bankruptcy. § 7oe, however, provides that "the
trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt which any creditor of such
bankrupt might have avoided" and places no four months' limitation of time
upon the trustee. The trustee of the bankrupt corporation therefore relied
on § 7oe in seeking to avoid the conveyance~· to the petitioner, and based his
right upon the right which "any creditor" would have under the Ohio statute.
He was met with the contention that the Ohio statute, because it provides
for the appointment of a receiver to administer the debtor's assets for the benefit of all his creditors, is suspended by the existence of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Ohio
statute was not suspended and that the trustee in bankruptcy was therefore
empowered to avoid the conveyances. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (in 218 Fed. 730, 134 C. C. A. 4o8) was unable to reach a
satisfactory conclusion, and certified the question to the Supreme Court,
which held that the Ohio statute was not suspended by the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
The Supreme Court cited, in support of its decision that the Ohio statute
was not a bankruptcy law, Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 4g6 and In re Farrell,
176 Fed. 505, 100 C. C. A. 63. Both of these cases passed on an Ohio statute
governing assignments for the benefit of creditors and containing provisions,
both for a receiver and for distribution of the debtor's assets, substantially
like those in the statute considered in the principal case; and both cases
held that the assignments made under the statute were good. The principal
case of course goes much further ; it holds not merely that a statutory assignment passes title-which might have passed without the aid of the statute-but that the making of a fraudulent or preferential transfer shall have the
possible effect ·of turning all of the debtor's property into the hands of a
receiver who shall use it for the benefit of all the creditors.
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The legality, pending the existence of a Federal Bankruptcy Act, of similar provisions in State Insolvency laws has been questioned in numerous
cases, and it seems clear that in most cases the decisions have been against
their validity. In Ketcham v. McNamara., 72 Conn. 709; Capital Lumber Co.
v. Saunders, 26 Idaho 4o8; Closser v. Strawn, 227 Fed. 139; and Hasbrouck
v. La Febre, 23 Wyo. 367, State statutes provided for insolvency proceedings
and gave power to an assignee or receiver to set aside preferential and
fraudulent transfers made by the insolvent; in all of these cases suits were
brought to set aside such transfers, and in each case it was held th:i.t the
suit must fail because the State statute, being in confiict with the Bankruptcy Act, was suspended. And in Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, it was
held, under a similar statute, that the insolvent's subsequently appointed
trustee in bankruptcy could not invoke the provision of the State statute to
set aside an attachment. It is difficult to reconcile these decisions, especially
Pelan v. Sheridan, with the principal cllse, except on one ground, namely,
that in all of these cases the State statutes provided for a discharge of the
insolvent's debts, while in the Ohio statute there is no such provision. This
point is referred to in the opinion of Mr. Justice DAY, who says: "And while
it is not necessary to decide that there may not be state insolvent laws which
are suspended although not providing for a discharge of indebtedness, all the
cases lay stress upon the fact that one of the principal requisites of a true
bankruptcy law is for the benefit of the debtor in that it discharges his future
acquired property from the obligation of existing debts."
An interesting instance of the same distinction is furnished by the two
Maine cases of Moody v. Development Co., 102 Me. 365, and Carter, Carter
& Meigs Co. v. Stewart Drug G_o., II5 Me. 28g. A Maine statute, passed in
1905, provided for the winding up of insolvent corporations by the appointment of a receiver, and also provided, inter alia, that all claims not duly presented should be barred. Proceedings under this statute were dismissed in
the Moody case on the ground that the statute was an insolvent law and
was therefore overridden by the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Subsequently
the State statute was amended by ·repealing the provision for the barring
of claims, ;µid when the validity of the amended law was presented in
the Carter case the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld it, saying:
''It was evidently the judgment of the Legislature that the amendment met
and overcame the objections set forth in Moody v. Development Co. * * *
[and] freed the Act of 1905 from its unconstitutional features, and such appears to have been the opinion of this court."
There is, therefore, authority for making the broad distinction which has
been suggested, namely, that a State statute is suspended and superseded if
it attempts to bar or discharge debts, and it is continued in force if it does
not. But it is clear that this distinction, broad and simple though it be, has
not been unanimously approved. See In re Weedman Stave Co., 199 Fed.
948, holding that a State statute will be suspended
though it does not
provide for a discharge, and see also the cautious language of Mr. Justice
DAY, quoted above from the opinion in the principal case.
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And on the other hand, it is argued with some plausibility that such a
State statute, even though it provides for a discharge of the debtor, may yet
be given effect as to its other provisions. The provisions for discharge are
of course suspended by the Federal Bankruptcy Act, but this does not necessarily suspend the statute in toto, (Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379) and other
provisions of the statute may well be enforced, especially under circumstances
like those in the principal case and in Pelton v. Sheridan, supra, where because of the four months' limitation, the trustee would be remediless under
the Bankruptcy Act, and where the enforcement of the apposite provisions
of the State statute would result in a benefit to many creditors instead of
one transferee. As is pointed out in the principal case, the suspension of
the Ohio statute would result in turning over to the fraudulent vendee "a part
of the estate which is being administered in bankruptcy, although the conveyance under which the property is claimed is voidable under the laws of
the State where it was made and the alleged right in the property secured.
We think that Congress in the Bankruptcy Act did not intend any such result, but meant to permit the trustee in bankruptcy to have the benefit of
state laws of this character which do not conflict with the aims and purposes
of· the Federal law." So, too, in Pelton v. Sheri"dan, supra, in a dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice BENNETT, it is said: "The tendency of the federal
decisions on this point, of which Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533, 537,
is an example, seems to be to treat the assignment as valid and to recognize
it so far as it is an aid of the purpose of the law and beneficial to the bankrupt's estate. In its effect of dissolving the previous attachment in the state
court, the assignment was advantageous to the bankrupt's estate and efficient
in carrying out the general design of the law to provide an equal distribution
of his estate for the benefit of all his creditors in proportion to the amounts
of their respective claims.
* Upholding the attachment, under the circumstances of this case, is at variance with this policy and secures· to one
creditor a preference by reason of his attachment, which was dissolved by
the assignment under the state law, while the opposite determination of the
issue will give effect to the intent of both state and federal legislation." The
cogency of this argument is obvious, and it applies to provisions in state
statutes which contain other provisions barring claims of creditors (as in
the Connecticut, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wyoming statutes considered in the cases cited supra) just as effectively as to provisions in state
statutes which do not contain such other provisions (as the Ohio statute in
the principal case). As is indicated above, the cases in the state courts are
clearly against this view, but the Supreme Court of the United States is not
yet committed on the question, and there is basis in its opinions for an argument in favor of the more liberal view-a view which, it is submitt1..d, would
serve better to accomplish the desirable r~sult of administering all of a bankrupt's estate for the benefit of all his creditors.
E. H.
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